



¿Qué es la estrategia en materia geopolítica?

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In Fortus we understand strategy as a discipline of power. Not as a succession of occurrences, nor as a mere planning of actions, not even as the accumulation of privileged information. The strategy is the ability to read reality, identify the interests that move the relevant actors, anticipate their possible reactions and align means, resources and times with priority purposes.

In politics and geopolitics, this capacity is decisive. Actors competing for power, influence or the capacity for social transformation do not operate in a neutral environment. They move in scenarios of uncertainty, friction, competition and accelerated change. Governments, parties, institutions, international organizations, think tanks, foundations, regulated companies and civil society platforms act within ecosystems where each decision generates consequences, opens opportunities, provokes resistance and forces to renounce alternatives.

Therefore, the strategy cannot be confused with planning. Planning is to order actions. Strategy is to decide what actions deserve to be carried out, at what time, with which allies, against which adversaries, with what risks and to achieve which ultimate goal. Nor can it be confused with intelligence, even if intelligence is one of its essential conditions. Information allows knowing; the strategy allows deciding.

Our work in political intelligence and geopolitical risks is part of that premise: to help our clients understand the terrain before acting. In many cases, organizations do not fail because of lack of resources, but because of lack of strategic thinking. They have contacts, budget, communication capacity, institutional presence or even access to decision makers, but they lack an architecture that connects diagnosis, objectives, scenarios, costs, alliances and execution.

Fortus works precisely in that space.

Read the reality before intervening on it

The first duty of any strategic actor is to read reality as it is, not as I wish it were. In politics, this principle seems evident, but is constantly violated. Political actors tend to interpret the world from their preferences, their ideological postulates, their internal prejudices or their immediate communicative needs. However, reality does not reward intentions, but the ability to correctly understand the terrain.

This difference is crucial. A campaign, an alliance, an institutional intervention, a diplomatic decision or a strategy of influence may be motivated by legitimate ends and still fail if they start from a wrong diagnosis. Recent history is full of examples of governments that confused their desires with reality: external interventions that were presented as liberations and perceived as invasions; political campaigns that assumed that the voter would react in a way and end up reacting from the opposite; institutions that measured their impact by spreading their messages, without wondering whether those messages had really altered someone's opinion.

In Fortius, strategic analysis begins with a simple and demanding question: what is the real starting point? Before designing a point of arrival, we must correctly identify the current location. Without that point A, any point B is a fantasy. In practical terms, this involves mapping actors, interests, incentives, capabilities, vulnerabilities, legal constraints, internal resistances, opportunity windows and alternative scenarios.

This logic applies both to an electoral campaign and to an institutional negotiation, to the entry into a new political market, to the international positioning of an organization or to the analysis of a geopolitical crisis.

The European case: alliances, political families and balance of power

One of the areas where this way of thinking is most visible is European politics. The European Parliament is not only a legislative chamber. It is also an area of competence between political families, national governments, personal leaders, national delegations, strategic interests and geopolitical balances.

The reorganisation of the European conservative area following the European elections of 2024 provided a clear example of the relationship between Italy, Hungary and Romania within the European right-wing ecosystem. This cannot be understood solely as a game of ideological affinities but was, above all, a strategic problem in which Fortius played a fundamental role.

When a leader like Giorgia Meloni sought to consolidate his European position, he not only had to add support. He had to decide which supports would suit him, which could strengthen him, which could contaminate his image, which could overshadow him, and which could alter his margin of dialogue with other actors. In this context, the possible integration of Hungarian forces close to Viktor Orbán into the space of the European Conservatives and Reformists was presented, at the same time, as an opportunity and a threat.

It was an opportunity because Hungary represented a strong conservative partner, with experience of government and political weight of its own. But it was also a threat for two reasons. First, because of the reputational cost associated with Orbán in many European spaces, where his figure generated intense resistance and activated sanitary cords. Second, because of the risk that too powerful a leadership within the same space would end up overshadowing Meloni or displacing the center of gravity of the political family.

The strategy, therefore, consisted not in adding but in adding intelligently. Well, the incorporation of Romanian actors into the European conservative space allowed solving several problems at the same time. On the one hand, it strengthened the group numerically and politically. On the other hand, it introduced a relevant partner in a key region for Italy, especially because of the importance of the Balkan route in migration matters. Moreover, the Romanian presence generated a deterrent effect against Hungary, given the historical tension between the two national spaces around Transylvania and the rivalry between national right-wings that, while sharing some ideological coordinates, respond to profoundly different national interests.

The strategic result was more sophisticated than a simple parliamentary operation. It allowed Meloni to broaden its base, strengthen its position on the Eastern European flank, keep Orbán close but not inside, maintain the capacity to interact with the European People's Party and, at the same time, not completely break bridges with the Patriot space for Europe.

This type of decision shows how the political strategy really works. It is not a question of choosing between allies and adversaries in abstract terms, but of understanding what configuration of actors maximizes the margin of manoeuvre of their own. Sometimes, the most important decision is not to incorporate the strongest partner, but to incorporate the partner that best alters the incentives of the rest.

In European politics, six Romanian MEPs can have more strategic value than a great ideological statement. A national delegation can change the architecture of a political family. A regional alliance can affect migration policy, the relationship with Brussels, the balance between the insurgent right-wing and the insurgent right-wing, and the international positioning of a prime minister.

That is the kind of reading that Fortius incorporates into his work of political intelligence: understanding the visible dimension and invisible dimension of each movement.

Greenland, the Arctic and hemispheric security

Contemporary geopolitics requires looking beyond the headline. US interest in Greenland, for example, has often been presented in terms of natural resources, rare lands or political eccentricity. However, a deeper strategic reading forces Greenland to be placed within a much greater architecture: the hemispheric security of the United States, competition with Russia and China, control of new trade routes and reconfiguration of the Arctic space.

Greenland is not only a remote island under Danish sovereignty. It is a geopolitical platform in the North Atlantic, a key piece in the defense of the Western Hemisphere and a point of projection towards the Arctic. In a context of progressive thaw, open sea routes and competition between major powers, its importance increases considerably.

The Arctic connects security, commerce, energy, military presence, port infrastructure, shipyards, icebreakers, routes to Eurasia and rivalry between powers. Russia has a very important historical and material presence in the region. China, although not an Arctic state, has tried to project itself as an actor close to the Arctic through investments, infrastructure and economic presence. For the United States, allowing that space to be dominated by strategic competitors would mean accepting vulnerabilities in its own security environment.

From that perspective, interest in Greenland cannot be reduced to a matter of minerals. It has to do with the possibility of controlling what is happening “upstreams” of the Western Hemisphere. It has to do with preventing Russia or China from consolidating positions near the American continental mass. It has to do with the possibility of opening trade routes that connect North America with Eurasia without depending on traditional channels, Western Europe or more vulnerable routes.

The US strategy, in this sense, responds to an imperial logic in the classical sense of the term: securing the perimeter, controlling accesses, reducing vulnerabilities, controlling routes and preventing rival powers from settling in the immediate environment. The novelty is not necessarily that the United States thinks so; the novelty is that, at certain political times, it says so more clearly.

For Fortius, this type of analysis is essential because it makes it possible to distinguish between media explanation and strategic explanation. The first one is left in the anecdote. The second question is what structural interests are behind it, what actors are moving on the ground, what incentives local communities have, what role political elites play, what margin Denmark has, what impact it can have on NATO and how all this is inserted into the global competition between the United States, Russia and China.

Venezuela, Iran and the anticipatory logic of geopolitics

Another example of strategic thinking appears in the connection between Venezuela and Iran, within the framework of energy security and U.S. foreign policy. From a superficial reading, Venezuela can be analyzed as an Ibero-American problem, a question of drug trafficking, an institutional crisis or a dossier of diplomatic pressure. But the strategic reading forces us to wonder why certain decisions are made at a specific time and not at another.

In international politics, events are rarely isolated. A maneuver in the Caribbean may be related to an energy scenario in the Middle East. A crisis in Venezuela may be part of a preparation for an eventual escalation with Iran. Pressure on a Bolivarian

regime sought not only political change, but mainly to secure supplies, reduce vulnerabilities or have alternatives to a closure of the Strait of Ormuz.

This is one of the keys to geopolitical intelligence: when the media cycle is talking about an episode, strategic decision makers are usually thinking about the next. While the public conversation is concentrated in Venezuela, some decision centers may be calculating the impact of Iran. While drug trafficking is being discussed, an energy architecture may be being prepared. While interpreting a maneuver as ideological, it may respond to a logic of supply, national security or scenario preparation.

Fortius works with this anticipating logic. It is not enough to describe what has happened. It is necessary to understand which chain of decisions can be activated, which hypotheses are handled by the relevant actors, what risks they try to cover and what current movements can make sense only in the light of a later scenario.

In the case of Iran, any escalation affected global energy security, the price of oil, maritime trade, regional balance, Israel's position, the U.S. margin of action, the transatlantic relationship and the European position. If Europe decided not to accompany a certain US operation, it would alter Washington's incentives. If Israel acted with greater autonomy, it would condition the United States. If the Strait of Ormuz became a real risk, Venezuela ceased to be a regional issue and became part of a global energy equation.

The strategy is precisely to see those connections before they are obvious.

To choose implies to resign

Every serious strategy requires taking on costs. In politics, this truth is often hidden because public communication tends to present decisions as if all desirable options are compatible with each other. But they are not. Each decision opens one way and closes others. Each alliance strengthens one position and weakens another. Each message mobilizes one audience and can drive away another. Each external operation solves one problem and creates new risks.

Therefore, scenario analysis is central to Fortius's work. It is not a question of telling the client what to do from a dogmatic position, but of showing him what each of the available options implies. What benefits it offers. What costs it brings. What risks it opens. What actors will react. What alternatives will be discarded. What room there will be to correct later. And what decisions, once made, generate paths difficult to reverse.

In the European case, incorporating a particular political actor can numerically strengthen a parliamentary family, but pollute its reputation or reduce its ability to interact with other forces. Keeping it out can preserve institutional space, but push it into another competing space. In the geopolitical case, securing an alternative energy source can reinforce national security, but increase regional tension or erode legal and diplomatic commitments. In the case of a political campaign, radicalizing a message can mobilize a base, but closing opportunities for cross-cutting growth.

The strategy does not eliminate costs. It makes them visible.

The strategy is always interactive

No actor acts alone. This is another central principle. Every strategy unfolds in an environment where other actors observe, interpret and respond. Opponents react. Allies condition. Partners limit. Third parties alter incentives. Even seemingly secondary actors can modify the final result.

European politics offers a clear example: Italy does not decide in the abstract its strategy within the conservative space. It decides taking into account Hungary, Romania, the European People's Party, Patriots for Europe, the European Commission, migration dynamics, media perceptions, national delegations and its own domestic electorate.

The same thing happens on the American stage. Washington does not act on Greenland, Venezuela or Iran in a vacuum. Its movements are read by Russia, China, Denmark, Canada, Mexico, Israel, the European Union, energy markets, local actors and related or opposing political networks. Each decision modifies the board.

Therefore, strategic thinking is less like the elaboration of a linear plan and more like a game of chess with multiple players, changing rules and incomplete information. The question is not only what we want to do, but how others will react if we do it. What options we open for them. What incentives we change for them. What alliances we can provoke against us. What opportunities we can create for others to act in our favor.

Fortius incorporates this interactive dimension into his analyses. It is not enough to design an internal road map. We need to anticipate the ecosystem response.

Political intelligence: from data to criterion

Political intelligence does not consist solely of gathering information. Information abounds; the criterion is scarce. True value is in selecting, verifying, ordering and interpreting relevant information to make it a decision.

This involves working with sources, signals, conversations, public data, institutional analysis, monitoring of actors, electoral dynamics, regulatory positions, parliamentary movements, media, networks of influence and international contexts. But it implies, above all, knowing what each piece means within a broader structure.

In political campaigns, for example, it is not always possible to measure directly what you want to know. A voter may not know how to define himself ideologically, or can do so in an imprecise way. An organization may want to measure the social impact of an idea, but there is no perfect way to know how many people really changed their minds after reading a report, attending an event, or watching a campaign.

In these cases, political intelligence works with approximations, indirect and proxy indicators. Income, place of residence, habits of information consumption, family structure, religiosity, patterns of participation or cultural consumption can offer clues about ideological positions, political sensitivities or probabilities of mobilization. They do not replace reality, but they help to approach it when reality cannot be measured directly.

This logic also applies to the impact of ideas. A think tank can measure readings, mentions, media appearances, attendance at events or circulation of their reports. But those data are only useful if interpreted correctly. Dissemination does not necessarily amount to influence. Visibility does not necessarily amount to cultural change. Scope does not necessarily amount to conversion. Strategy requires distinguishing between activity metrics and impact metrics.

The execution: where good strategies die

Strategic design is indispensable, but insufficient. Many strategies fail not because they are poorly conceived, but because they are not properly executed. Paper endures everything. PowerPoints can be brilliant. Diagnostics can be accurate. Scenarios can be well constructed. But, without operational structure, strategy becomes literature.

Execution requires equipment, times, responsibilities, discipline, follow-up, adaptation and corrective capacity. It also requires understanding that no strategy survives intact in contact with reality. Actors react, resources change, allies fail, adversaries anticipate, window of opportunity closes and external events alter priorities.

Therefore, Fortius does not conceive the strategy as a closed document, but as an architecture of decision and action. A good plan must be clear enough to guide implementation and flexible enough to adapt to the evolution of the terrain.

In geopolitics, implementation is especially complex because mistakes are paid fast. A bad reading of an ally can close a door for years. An inappropriate statement can destroy an institutional relationship. A poorly calibrated alliance can isolate an actor. An external decision can generate side effects that are difficult to control. A poorly executed campaign can reinforce exactly the adversary that it intended to weaken.

Our approach

Fortus combines political intelligence, geopolitical analysis and strategic design to accompany actors who need to move safely in complex environments.

Our work can include analysis of actors, mapping of power, scenario design, evaluation of political risks, monitoring of electoral dynamics, analysis of parliamentary alliances, reading of international conflicts, identification of influence opportunities, advice on institutional positioning and strategic accompaniment in decision-making processes.

We do it from a conviction: in politics and geopolitics it is not enough to be right. We must know how to read the moment, choose the terrain, identify the actors, anticipate reactions, assume costs, build alliances and execute precisely.

The strategy is ultimately the difference between acting and simply reacting, between having information and having criteria, between occupying space and building power, between issuing messages and producing impact.

At Fortius we help our customers understand the board before moving tab.